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The Competitive Effects of the Louisiana Scholarship Program 
 on Public School Performance 
 
Abstract 
Given the significant growth rate and geographic expansion of private school choice programs 
over the past two decades, it is important to examine how traditional public schools respond to 
the sudden injection of competition for students and resources. This article uses 1) a school fixed 
effects approach, and 2) a regression discontinuity framework to examine the achievement 
impacts of the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP). This targeted school voucher program has 
provided public funds for low-income students in low-performing public schools to enroll in 
participating private schools since the 2012-13 school year. The main findings of the competitive 
effects analysis reveal neutral to positive impacts that are small in magnitude. Effects are largest 
for students attending those public schools most affected by the competitive threat. Policy 
implications are discussed. 




The Competitive Effects of the Louisiana Scholarship Program on Public School 
Performance 
1. Introduction 
Publicly funded private school choice programs currently operate in twenty states plus the 
District of Columbia (Frendewey et al., 2015). Much of this growth in private school choice 
programs has been recent, with the total number of programs in operation nationwide increasing 
from 32 to 39 in 2013-14 alone. Given the significant growth rate and geographic expansion of 
private school choice programs over the past two decades, how should we expect traditional 
public schools to respond to the competition? In this article, I exploit variation in the geographic 
location of private schools in Louisiana to estimate the competitive impact of a private school 
choice program on public school math and English language arts achievement. 
The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is a targeted school voucher program that 
provides public funds for low-income students in low-performing public schools to enroll in 
participating private schools, both religious and non-religious. Initially piloted in New Orleans in 
2008, Act 2 of the 2012 Regular Session expanded the LSP statewide, allowing thousands of 
public school students to transfer out of their residentially-assigned public schools and into 
private schools across the state of Louisiana. In order to be eligible for a voucher, a student’s 
family income must not have exceeded 250% of the federal poverty guidelines and they must 
have been entering Kindergarten or coming from a public school that received a “C,” “D,” or “F” 
grade in October 2011. In school year 2012-13, 9,831 eligible Louisiana students applied for an 
LSP voucher. Ultimately 4,954 students from low-performing public schools used these 
vouchers to enroll in private schools. All of these students were low-income and approximately 
80 percent were African American. The value of the scholarship varied by school, depending on 
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the tuition and fees at each participating private school, but it was capped at the amount the state 
expends on public education through its minimum foundation program. Thus, the average value 
of an LSP scholarship in 2012-13 was $5,245, which was approximately $3,000 dollars less than 
what it cost to send a student to a “C,” “D,” or “F” graded public school that year. 
While all Louisiana private schools experienced some degree of private school 
competition prior to 2012-13, the statewide expansion of the program constituted a policy shock 
that arguably increased the competitive pressure experienced by all public schools. For those 
public schools graded “C,” “D,” or “F” this shock would have been especially salient, as their 
students suddenly became eligible to transfer to a private school alternative at state expense. 
Using an identification strategy that relies on this distinction between eligible and ineligible 
public schools, I exploit the timing of the voucher policy in Louisiana to estimate the public 
school response to private school competition. While the observed impacts are small, three out of 
four competition measures reveal a positive, statistically significant impact on public school 
math scores and two out of four competition measures reveal a positive and statistically 
significant impact on English Language Arts scores. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, I put the LSP in context by 
presenting statistics on the set of all private school choice programs that currently exist in the 
United States. I then describe the theoretical framework, followed by a summary of the literature 
on the competitive impacts of private school choice programs. The next section describes the 
data and research design used in this analysis, followed by a presentation of the results. The 




2. Private School Choice Programs in the U.S. 
By June 2015, 45 private school choice programs had been enacted in the U.S. in 23 states plus 
the District of Columbia (Table 1). In absolute terms, the two largest voucher programs are 
Florida’s John M. McKay Scholarship for Students with Disabilities Program and Indiana’s 
Choice Scholarship Program. Nonetheless, these enrollment figures pale in comparison to those 
associated with the largest tax credit scholarship program—Florida’s Tax Credit Scholarship 
program—which enrolled close to 70,000 students in 2014-15, representing almost two percent 
of all children in that state. The Louisiana Scholarship Program is not unusual in that it targets 
low-income families, joining 23 other private school choice programs that require applicants’ 
family income to fall below a given threshold in order for a student to be eligible to participate. 
With 7,362 participants in 2014-15, the most recent year for which data are available, the LSP 
was the tenth largest means-tested program in the country, in terms of the percentage of all 
school-aged children in the state served. In this regard, an analysis of the LSP offers useful 
insight into similar programs across the nation.
 
 
Table 1.  
Programmatic Details of Private School Choice Programs in the U.S., 2014-15 
State Program Enacted Income-Limit if Program is Means Tested Enrollment 
Tax Credit Scholarship Programs    
Alabama Tax Credits for Contributions to 
Scholarship Granting Organizations 
2013 Family income cannot exceed 150% of median 
household income in Alabama ($60,734 in 2012) 
2,851 
Arizona Individual School Tuition Organization 
Tax Credit 
1997 Not Means Tested 40,918 
Arizona Corporate School Tuition Organization 
Tax Credit 
2006 Family income cannot exceed 185% of the federal 
free or reduced-price lunch level ($81,628 for a 
family of four in 2014) 
12,955 
Arizona Lexie's Law  2009 Not Means Tested 345 
Florida Florida Tax Credit Scholarship 2001 Family income cannot exceed 185% of the federal 
poverty level ($44,123 for a family of four in 2014) 
69,671 
Georgia Georgia Scholarship Tax Credit 
Program 
2008 Not Means Tested 13,268 
Indiana  Corporate and Individual Scholarship 
Tax Credit Program  
2009 Family income cannot exceed 200% of the federal 
free or reduced-price lunch level ($88,246 for a 
family of four in 2014) 
11,067 
Iowa Individual and Corporate School Tuition 
Organization Tax Credit 
2006 Family income cannot exceed 300% of the federal 
poverty level ($71,550 for a family of four in 2014) 
10,254 
Kansas Tax Credit for Low Income Students 
Scholarship Program  
2014 Family income cannot exceed 100% of the federal 
poverty level ($23,850 for a family of four in 2014) 
n/a 
Louisiana Tuition Donation Rebate Program 2012 Family income cannot exceed 250% of the federal 




Education Tax Credit Program 2012 Family income cannot exceed 300% of the federal 
poverty level ($71,550 for a family of four in 2014) 
40 
Nevada Nevada Educational Choice Scholarship 
Program 
2015 Family income cannot exceed 300% of the federal 
poverty level ($71,550 for a family of four in 2014) 
n/a 
Oklahoma Equal Opportunity Education 
Scholarships 
2011 Family income cannot exceed 300% of the federal 
free or reduced-price lunch level ($132,369 for a 




State Program Enacted Income-Limit if Program is Means Tested Enrollment 
Pennsylvania Educational Improvement Tax Credit 2001 Family income cannot exceed $75,000, with an 
additional $15,000 allowed for each additional 
dependent 
38,278 
Pennsylvania Educational Opportunity Scholarship 
Tax Credit  
2012 Family income cannot exceed $75,000, with an 
additional $15,000 allowed for each additional 
dependent 
7,601 
Rhode Island Rhode Island Corporate Scholarship Tax 
Credit 
2006 Family income cannot exceed 250% of the federal 




Educational Credit for Exceptional 
Needs Children 
2013 Not Means Tested 405 
Virginia Education Improvement Scholarships 
Tax Credits  
2012 Family income cannot exceed 300% of the federal 
poverty level ($71,550 for a family of four in 2014) 
982 
Subtotal       209,808 
Voucher Programs     
Arkansas The Succeed Scholarship Program for 
Students with Disabilities 
2015 Not Means Tested n/a 
Colorado Douglas County Choice Scholarship 
Program 
2011 Not Means Tested n/a 
Florida John M. McKay Scholarship for 
Students with Disabilities Program 
1999 Not Means Tested 28,957 
Georgia Georgia Special Needs Scholarship 
Program 
2007 Not Means Tested 3,400 
Indiana  Choice Scholarship Program 2011 Family income cannot exceed 100% of the federal 
free or reduced-price lunch level ($44,123 for a 
family of four in 2014) for a full scholarship; 
Family income cannot exceed 150% of the federal 
free or reduced-price lunch level ($66,185 for a 
family of four) for a partial scholarship 
29,148 
Louisiana Student Scholarships for Educational 
Excellence Program (also referred to as 
the Louisiana Scholarship Program) 
2008 Family income cannot exceed 250 percent of the 





State Program Enacted Income-Limit if Program is Means Tested Enrollment 
Louisiana School Choice Pilot Program for Certain 
Students with Exceptionalities 
2010 Not Means Tested 311 
Mississippi Mississippi Dyslexia Therapy 
Scholarship 
2012 Not Means Tested 116 
Mississippi Mississippi Speech-Language Therapy 
Scholarship 
2013 Not Means Tested 1 
North 
Carolina 
Opportunity Scholarship Program 2013 Family income cannot exceed 133% of the federal 
free or reduced-price lunch level ($58,684 for 




Children with Disabilities Scholarship 
Grants 
2013 Not Means Tested 356 
Ohio Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring 
Program 
1995 Priority given to students living below 200% of the 
federal poverty level ($47,700 for a family of four 
in 2014) 
7,449 
Ohio Autism Scholarship Program 2003 Not Means Tested 3,181 
Ohio Educational Choice Scholarship 
Program 
2005 Priority given to students living below 200% of the 
federal poverty level ($47,700 for a family of four 
in 2014) 
20,261 
Ohio Jon Peterson Special Needs Scholarship 
Program 
2011 Not Means Tested 3680 
Ohio Income Based Scholarship Program 
(EdChoice Expansion) 
2013 Family income below 200% of the federal poverty 
level ($47,700 for family of four in 2014) for full 
scholarship, with priority given to students from 
families at or below the federal poverty level 
($23,850 for a family of four in 2014); Family 
income below 400% of the federal poverty level 
($95,400 for a family of four in 2014) for a partial 
scholarship for renewal students 
3,702 
Oklahoma Lindsey Nicole Henry Scholarship for 
Students with Disabilities Program 
2010 Not Means Tested 384 
Utah Carson Smith Special Needs 
Scholarship 
2005 Not Means Tested 700 
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State Program Enacted Income-Limit if Program is Means Tested Enrollment 
Washington 
D.C. 
D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program 2004 Family income cannot exceed the federal free or 
reduced-price lunch level ($44,123 for a family of 
four in 2014); 300% for renewal students ($71,550 
for a family of four in 2014) 
1,442 
Wisconsin Milwaukee Parental Choice Program 1990 Family income cannot exceed 300% of the federal 
poverty level ($71,550 for a family of four in 
2014), with an additional $7,000 allowed for 
households with married parents 
26,930 
Wisconsin Racine Parental Choice Program 2011 Family income cannot exceed 300% of the federal 
poverty level ($71,550 for a family of four in 
2014), with an additional $7,000 allowed for 
households with married parents 
1,740 
Wisconsin Wisconsin Parental Choice Program 2013 Family income cannot exceed 185% of the federal 
poverty level ($44,123 for a family of four in 
2014), with an additional $7,000 allowed for 
households with married parents 
1,007 
Subtotal       141,326 
Education Savings Accounts      
Arizona Arizona Empowerment Scholarship 
Accounts Program 
2011 Not Means Tested 1,311 
Florida Personal Learning Scholarship Accounts 2014 Not Means Tested 1,294 
Mississippi Equal Opportunity for Students with 
Special Needs Program 
2015 Not Means Tested n/a 
Tennessee Individualized Education Program 2015 Not Means Tested n/a 
Nevada Nevada Education Savings Account 
Program 
2015 Not Means Tested n/a 
Subtotal       2,605 
TOTAL       353,739 
Note: n/a means not applicable. This is because enrollment and expenditure statistics are not yet available for programs enacted in 
2015. Sources: Frendeway, Sawatka, Marcavage, Carney, Martinez, & Dauphin (2015); Annual Estimates of the Resident Population 
for Selected Age Groups by Sex for the United States, States, Counties, and Puerto Rico Commonwealth and Municipios: 2014 , U.S. 
Census Bureau, Population Division, June 2015. 
 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
The theory of reform behind market-based school choice programs is that expanded choice and 
competition will directly benefit participants by allowing them to seek out an effective school 
that best fits their needs and interests as well as exerting competitive pressure on traditional 
public schools to improve (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1962), resulting in “a rising tide” of 
school improvement (Hoxby, 2001). In order for this theory to hold, a set of core assumptions 
must be upheld. 
First, for an education marketplace to function as theorized, families must have valid and 
reliable information about their school options so that they select a high quality school that will 
be a good fit for their child’s needs (Schneider, Teske, & Marschall, 2000; Schneider, Teske, 
Marschall, & Roch, 1998; Van Dunk & Dickman, 2002). Second, the private and public school 
providers must be able to identify specific characteristics of high-performing schools so that they 
can judge which specific responses to competition will result in increased school quality. Bagley 
(2006) identifies five categories of operational responses by which schools might potentially 
respond to competition. This includes substantive changes to curriculum or facilities, in addition 
to structural changes to school governance. Given this variety of ways in which schools could 
potentially respond to competition, it is particularly important that school leaders are informed 
about factors related to school success so that they can learn from their competitors. Third, 
school leaders must be able to access those resources associated with their competitors’ success. 
For example, families’ choices may be constrained if funding is not provided for transportation 
to schools of choice (Ryan & Heise, 2002). Similarly, some school leaders may face legal, 
political, or economic constraints that prevent them from replacing ineffective teachers with 
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higher-quality ones (Anzia & Moe, 2013; Cohen-Vogel & Osborne-Lampkin, 2007; Egalite, 
Jensen, Stewart, & Wolf, 2014). 
Given these potential obstacles, and other scenarios by which market failure might occur, 
some have questioned if market-based school reforms could have unanticipated consequences, 
such as diminished resources, racial and economic segregation, and suboptimal academic 
experiences for the students who are left behind in public schools (Altonji, Huang, & Taber, 
2015; Brunner, Imazeki, & Ross, 2010; Lankford & Wyckoff, 2001). Further, national and state 
media outlets regularly run opinion columns in which prominent politicians, teachers’ union 
leaders, and activists accuse private school vouchers of siphoning funds from public schools, 
arguing that private school choice programs remove financial resources from those public 
schools that are most in need of revenue in order to improve (McCall, 2014; Rich, 2014; Schrier, 
2014; Weingarten, 2013).  
In light of these factors, there are three primary responses we might hypothesize would 
result from injecting competitive pressure into K-12 public schooling in Louisiana. First, by 
granting students the financial resources to exit a dissatisfactory public school, vouchers might 
provide those public schools with a financial incentive to improve their performance. School 
leaders might work harder to encourage innovation, add or improve school programs, and 
organize staffing and curricula in a manner that is maximally responsive to student needs. 
Similarly, teachers and other staff members might exert more effort to tutor students or provide 
additional assistance where necessary. If this is the case, we might observe a general rise in test 
scores in those schools experiencing the strongest competitive pressures.  
Alternatively, competition from a private school choice program might negatively 
influence teachers’ job satisfaction, relations between school staff and parents, and teachers’ 
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quality of life (Ladd & Fiske, 2003). Further, such competition might force traditional public 
schools to offer an overly diverse and thematically incoherent set of courses to appeal to a broad 
set of student interests (Fiske & Ladd, 2000), which may come at the expense of deep instruction 
in core areas. Further, public schools’ response to competition might involve limiting 
instructional and administrative staff or increasing class sizes. Responses to such changes might, 
in turn, result in a general lowering of morale and decline in school-wide performance. This 
could be exacerbated by compositional and resource changes if the highest-achieving and most 
motivated families were to exit the public schools en masse (Lubienski, Gulosino, & Weitzel, 
2009). If this were to happen, private school vouchers might rob the public schools of academic 
and social capital—the positive peer effects of high achieving classmates and the influence of 
motivated families who would push for overall school improvements—resulting in a downward 
spiral for public school performance. Thus, we might expect to see lower average scores and 
reduced parental involvement in those public schools that experienced the greatest competition 
(Epple & Romano, 1998; Ladd, 2002; McMillan, 2000). 
The third hypothesized response is none at all. If the threat from competition is trivial or 
schools simply respond with empty symbolic gestures (Hess, 2002; Sullivan, Campbell, & 
Kisida, 2008), focusing on promotional activities (Lubienski, 2007) and marketing efforts 
(Jabbar, 2015; Loeb, Valant, & Kasman, 2011) in lieu of improving academic programming, the 
impact of the choice program will not be detectable in students’ academic outcomes. We might 
anticipate this scenario occurring if the private school voucher program is small in scale, under-
funded, or politically unstable. An equally important explanation might be that schools are 
already maximizing performance given existing financial and physical resources as well as the 




There is a wealth of empirical literature examining competition responses in traditional public 
schools occurring as the result of a private school choice program such as a tuition tax credit or 
voucher program. Of the 19 published studies of competitive effects from vouchers/ tax credit 
scholarships, all find neutral to positive results (Table 2). The majority of these studies have 
taken place in Florida (nine studies) and Milwaukee, Wisconsin (five studies). 
 
 
Table 2.  
Empirical Studies of the Competitive Effects of Voucher/Tax Credit Scholarship Programs in the U.S. 
Study Publication 
Year 
Program Type Competition Measure Summary  
of Findings 
Published in a Peer-
Reviewed Journal? 
Florida (9)      
Chakrabarti 2013 Voucher Receipt of an 'F' grade Positive Yes 
Rouse et al. 2013 Voucher Receipt of an 'F' grade Positive Yes 
Forster 2008 Voucher Receipt of an 'F' grade Positive No 
Figlio and Rouse 2006 Voucher Receipt of an 'F' grade Positive Yes 
West and Peterson 2006 Voucher Receipt of an 'F' grade Positive Yes 
Greene and Winters 2004 Voucher Receipt of an 'F' grade Positive Yes 
Greene 2001 Voucher Receipt of an 'F' grade Positive No 
Greene and Winters 2011 Disability 
Voucher 
Density (voucher-accepting private 
schools within 5 & 10 miles) 
Positive Yes 
Figlio and Hart 2014 Tax-credit 
Scholarship 
Distance, Density, Diversity, 
Concentration 
Positive Yes 
Milwaukee, WI (5)      
Greene and Marsh 2009 Voucher Density (relevant private schools 
within five different radii)  
Positive No 
Chakrabarti 2008 Voucher Share of poor children who would 




Carnoy et al. 2007 Voucher Share of poor children who would 
qualify for vouchers; Density 
Positive No 
Hoxby  2003 Voucher Share of poor children who would 
qualify for vouchers 
Positive No 
Greene and Forster 2002 Voucher Share of poor children who would 




Ohio (2)      











San Antonio, TX (2)      
Gray, Merrifield, and 
Adzima  
2014 Voucher Compared Edgewood district to 





Greene and Forster 2002 Voucher Compared Edgewood district to 
other districts with no voucher 
program 
Positive No 
District of Columbia (1)     
Greene and Winters 2007 Voucher Distance and Density (participating 
private schools within 1 mile) 
Neutral Yes 




In the state of Florida, three programs have provided publicly-funded vouchers for 
private school tuition of public school students wishing to transfer to private schools. The first is 
the Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program, established as part of the reform program known 
as the A+ Plan, which offered school vouchers to students attending public schools that were 
designated as failing twice in a four-year period. This program ran from June 1999 until the 
Florida Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional in January 2006. In total, there have been seven 
studies of the competitive effects of this program, all of which found positive competitive 
impacts on affected traditional public schools (Chakrabarti, 2013; Figlio & Rouse, 2006; Forster, 
2008a; Greene, 2001; Greene & Winters, 2004; Rouse, Hannaway, Goldhaber, & Figlio, 2013; 
West & Peterson, 2006). The second program is the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program, 
established in 2001 and still in operation today, providing vouchers to students from low-income 
families. Figlio and Hart (2014) found that increases in competition as a result of this tax credit 
program were associated with improvements in student test scores across a variety of 
competition measures. The third Florida program is the McKay Scholarships for Students with 
Disabilities Program, established in 1999 and currently serving approximately 24,000 students. A 
2008 study by Greene and Winters found that increased exposure to this voucher program is 
associated with substantial improvements in the test scores of students with disabilities that 
remain in the public school system. 
Another highly studied private school choice program is the Milwaukee Parental Choice 
Program (MPCP). Established in 1999, the MPCP provides vouchers to low and middle-income 
families to attend private schools at state expense. All five published studies of the competitive 
effects of the MPCP have shown a mixture of neutral-to-positive results (Carnoy et al., 2007; 




studies of competition effects from school voucher or tuition tax credit programs have also been 
conducted in Ohio (Carr, 2011; Forster, 2008b), Texas (Greene & Forster, 2002; Gray, 
Merrifield, & Adzima, 2014), and Washington D.C. (Greene & Winters, 2007). Of these 19 total 
studies, only one—an analysis of a voucher program in Washington D.C.—showed no impacts 
across all subjects (Greene & Winters, 2007). 
A competitive effects analysis of the Louisiana Scholarship Program offers a number of 
distinct advantages over existing studies in this area. First, this study of the competitive effects of 
the LSP has a strong identification strategy that takes advantage of a panel dataset instead of 
running descriptive analyses of cross-sectional data. By applying a school fixed effects model, 
this study takes full advantage of the policy changes that resulted in the introduction of the 
voucher program, comparing pre-program trends to achievement outcomes after the introduction 
of the policy. Second, this study takes advantage of the geographic diversity of a major school 
voucher program affecting thousands of students across an entire state. This maximizes the 
variation in competition faced by public schools in this state and increases the external validity 
of the analysis. Thus, whereas much of the previous work in this area has examined impacts 
within a single city or region, our approach increases the opportunity for results to be relevant in 
other contexts. Third, although a number of panel studies already exist that examine the impact 
of a school voucher program across an entire state (i.e., Florida), these studies are unable to 
disentangle the accountability effects of the A-F school letter grading policy from the 
competitive effects of the voucher threat for consistently low-performing schools because both 
policies were implemented at the same time. In Louisiana, however, the A-F school letter 
grading policy predates the voucher program, making it possible to compare achievement trends 




the accountability impact of a letter grading policy introduced concurrently, which has been 
shown to have significant impacts on student achievement (Bowen & Trivitt, 2014).  
Thus, this study represents the first panel data analysis of responses to private school 
competition conducted across an entire state and net of the stigma effect of an accountability 
policy. 
5. Data 
The data for this analysis come from a variety of sources. Student-level data on 2010-11 through 
2012-13 public school test scores for students in grades three through eight in math and English 
Language Arts (ELA) come from a restricted-use data file provided by the Louisiana Department 
of Education. Data on 2010-11 school performance scores and letter grades are publicly available 
on the Louisiana Department of Education’s website. Street addresses, latitude, and longitude for 
all public schools in Louisiana in 2010-11 were retrieved from the National Center for Education 
Statistics’ Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey. Finally, private school street 
addresses and information on religious orientation were retrieved from the National Center for 
Education Statistics’ Private School Universe Survey (PSS), 2011-12.  
6. Sample Selection 
To generate the analysis sample, I start with the universe of public schools that appear in the 
NCES 2010-11 file. The first screen keeps only those public schools that could be successfully 
mapped using ArcGIS software (approximately 90 percent of schools). The second screen 
requires each school to have a minimum of three students taking the state test—the Louisiana 
Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) or integrated Louisiana Educational Assessment 




schools. The third and fourth screens exclude charter schools, which already experience 
competition for enrollment and thus are not relevant for this study, and schools in New Orleans, 
where a pilot version of the LSP was already operating. This reduces the final sample to 781,733 
students in 939 schools, a total of 676 of which received a “C,” “D,” or “F” grade at baseline, 
making their students voucher-eligible.  
7. Empirical Approach 
Competition Measures 
I use a set of geocoded competition measures to capture variation in the level of private school 
competition experienced by public schools. These methods can be organized into four distinct 
categories: distance, density, diversity, and concentration.  
A distance measure quantifies competition by measuring the distance between a public 
school and its nearest private school competitor. In a metropolitan area, it is not uncommon for 
this value to be under a mile. The underlying assumption for using distance as a measure of 
competitive pressure is that shorter distances equate to a higher level of school choices for 
students and thus increased competition for enrollees by public schools. This measure has been 
previously used in studies of the competition effect of the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship 
Program and the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program (Figlio & Hart, 2014; Greene & 
Winters, 2007). For each eligible public school, I calculate the crow’s-flight distance—recorded 
in meters and converted to miles for analysis—to the nearest private school that was in existence 
before the announcement of the program. To ease interpretation, I multiply the distance variable 
by -1 so that a positive coefficient on the distance variable would represent the impact of closer 




A density measure quantifies the degree of competition faced by a school by counting the 
number of private competitors within a given radius. Such measures have been previously used 
in studies of competition effects of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, the Florida Tax 
Credit Scholarship Program, and Florida’s McKay Scholarship Program for Students with 
Disabilities (Carnoy et al., 2007; Figlio & Hart, 2014; Greene & Marsh, 2009; Greene & 
Winters, 2008). I generate density counts within 5 and 10 mile radii.  
A diversity measure counts the number of different types of local private schools that are 
close to a given public school. Using this method, competition is quantified by measuring the 
variety of schooling options available to students. Such a method has been previously used in a 
study of the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program (Figlio & Hart, 2014). I define private 
school type by religious affiliation. Thus, a given public school might have a value of 6 on the 
density measure, but if all 6 schools were Roman Catholic, it would only score a 1 on the 
diversity measure. 
The final competition measure uses a modified Herfindahl Index to capture market 
concentration. As described by Figlio and Hart (2014), this index is generated by summing the 
squared market shares held by each private school religious type within a given public school 
radius. Suppose, for instance, there are five private schools that fall within a ten mile radius of a 
given public school—four of these are Catholic schools and one is a Lutheran school. The 
market share for each school type is calculated as 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟
Σ𝑅Cou𝑛𝑡𝑟
. Catholic school market share, 
therefore, is .80 (i.e., 4/5) and Lutheran market share is .20 (i.e., 1/5). The Herfindahl Index is 
the sum of the squares of the market shares held by each school type—in this case (.80)^2 + 
(.20)^2= .68. Lower values of the Herfindahl Index are indicative of increased competitive 




particular religious type. Thus, a Herfindahl Index score of 1 suggests a monopoly market 
environment, where just one religious type has control of all private competitors within that 
radius. Conversely, a Herfindahl Index score of 0 represents a school market that is well-served 
by a diverse set of private schools. To ease interpretation of results, I use 1- the Herfindahl Index 
so that a positive coefficient on this variable would mean increased competition is associated 
with higher student outcomes and a negative coefficient would mean increased competition is 
associated with lower student outcomes. 
In general, for those public schools that are not matched to a single private school within 
each radius examined, it is appropriate to assign a zero as the competition measure for all of the 
competition measures described above except for the concentration measure, where a zero 
implies a perfectly competitive market. As such, those public schools not matched to a single 
private school must be dropped for those analyses relying upon the modified Herfindahl Index. 
In the results tables presented later in this article, the sample size is always smaller for those 
regressions measuring competition with the concentration index. 
In order to avoid reverse causation bias, all four geocoded variables are generated using 
data from before either program was announced. It’s also important to note that some of these 
measures are based on private school counts that weight all schools equally, regardless of school 
size. Such measures were deliberately chosen because one might expect that public school 
administrators are more likely to be aware of the existence of neighboring private schools than to 
be knowledgeable about the relative size of different competitors, such as knowing the number 
of enrollment slots that would be made available to students using a voucher. One potential 
criticism of these geocoded competition measures is that they suffer from endogeneity bias 




choice schools with a mission to enroll underserved students. This is more likely to be a problem 
in studies of competitive effects of charter schools, however, given evidence of the endogeneity 
of charter school location (Glomm, Harris, & Lo, 2005). In Louisiana, the private schools in 
question—mostly Catholic schools—existed for many years prior to the creation of the voucher 
program. Indeed, many of these schools were established in response to Catholic doctrine, which 
dictates that Catholic children should be educated in a Catholic school (Herbermann, 1912) and 
not in response to unsatisfactory public school performance. 
Table 3 summarizes the four competition measures across both the five and ten mile 
radii. The average public school is 6.39 miles from a private competitor, with a standard 
deviation of just over eight miles. Within a five-mile radius, public schools in Louisiana typically 
have five private competitors. On average, approximately two religious denominational types are 
represented and the mean value for the Herfindahl Index is .56. The mean values for this set of 
variables are predictably larger within a ten-mile radius—the average school has 11 private 
competitors and approximately three religious denominational types are represented. The 





Descriptive Statistics of Competition Measures 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Distance 6.39 8.23 .04 49.85 
5 Mile Radius     
Density 5.07 9.10 0 59 
Diversity  1.93 2.26 0 8 
Concentration .56 .30 .12 1 
10 Mile Radius     
Density 11.46 19.73 0 100 
Diversity  2.86 2.58 0 9 
Concentration .50 .28 0 1 
Note: Authors’ calculations. Distance is the number of miles to nearest private school 
competitor; Density is the number of local private schools falling within a given radius; Diversity 
is the number of religious denominational types represented; Concentration is calculated as a 
modified Herfindahl Index 
Source: Public school addresses from the National Center for Education Statistics, Common 
Core of Data (CCD), "Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey", 2010-11. Private 




A school fixed effects model is employed to estimate the effect of private school competition on 
public school performance, building upon the model estimated by Figlio and Hart (2014). The 
model takes the form 
(1)   Y𝑖𝑠𝑡 = α𝑠 + β1𝐶𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑡 ∗ CDF𝑡 + β2𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑠 + β3𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐷𝐹𝑡  +  γX𝑖𝑡 + μ𝑆𝑠𝑡 + δT𝑡 + ϵ𝑖𝑠𝑡 
where Yist is the standardized math or reading score for student i in school s in year t; αs is a 
school fixed effect; Cs is the measure of pre-policy competitive pressure facing school s; Pt is an 
indicator variable identifying the post-policy year; CDFt is an indicator variable identifying those 
schools that became voucher eligible because they received a “C,” “D,” or “F” grade from the 
state in 2011; Xit is a vector of student demographic control variables including gender, race, 
special education status, an indicator for limited English proficiency (LEP), and eligibility for 
free/reduced lunch for student i in year t; Sst is a vector of time-varying school characteristics 
(shares of students of each race and gender, the share eligible for free/reduced lunch, and the 
shares classified as LEP or special education); and Tt is a set of dummy variables indicating year. 
The β1 coefficient on the three-way-interaction of competition measures, post-policy year 
indicator, and a school’s “C,” “D,” or “F” grade is the parameter of interest. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school level.  
I start by running this model excluding all charter schools and all schools in New 
Orleans. I then repeat the analysis, keeping these schools in the analysis sample to see if their 
inclusion results in significant changes to the findings. The primary concern with including 
charter schools is that such schools are not experiencing a competitive “shock” in the same way 




authorization in general is to stimulate innovation and improvement in student achievement by 
setting up autonomous but highly accountable schools that must attract students in order to stay 
open. The concern with including schools in New Orleans, meanwhile, is that the school system 
in that city experienced a dramatic overhaul in the wake of Hurricane Katrina that resulted in the 
creation of a unique, reform-driven educational environment built on accountability, choice, and 
competition (Jabbar, 2015). “D” and “F” schools in New Orleans are under intense threat of 
closure, which is likely to be correlated with the outcome variable. Interacting the four 
competition measures with an indicator for “C,” “D,” or “F” graded schools is one step towards 
addressing this potential confound but doesn’t entirely address the problem because there are 
more private schools in New Orleans than in other parts of the state. Thus, the distance, density, 
diversity, and concentration measures are correlated with schools being in New Orleans, a city 
that has experienced significant growth in test scores in recent years (Harris, 2015). The final 
element of the three-way interaction goes a long way towards addressing this confounding factor, 
however. By comparing schools’ performance before and after the LSP policy change, the model 
isolates any changes in achievement that are directly related to the policy implementation. To 
test this important assumption, I run a placebo test that changes the “post policy” year to one 
year earlier in the data, when we would not expect to find any significant effects.  
A second identification concern arises from Louisiana’s application for a waiver from the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which won approval from the U.S. Department of 
Education in May 2012. This waiver granted the state flexibility from some of No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB)’s accountability sanctions. In particular, the waiver allowed Louisiana to give 
districts and schools increased flexibility in how to spend federal education funding of 




rigorous accountability system and adopt the Common Core State Standards and aligned 
assessments. There is little empirical evidence available yet on the productivity impact of NCLB 
waivers to draw upon but it is unlikely to be a major confounding concern for this analysis 
because both sets of schools being compared in this study (“A”- and “B”- graded schools, 
compared to “C,” “D,” and “F”- graded schools) would have been subject to the same 
accountability pressure associated with Louisiana’s NCLB waiver. 
8. Results 
The estimates reported in Table 4 represent the β1 coefficient on the three-way interaction 
between competition measure, post-policy year, and “C,” “D,” or “F” school grade. The top 
panel displays the main results across all eligible public schools in Louisiana, “C” through “F.” 
Within a ten-mile radius, competition is shown to have a statistically significant positive impact 
in math for two of the four measures used—density and diversity. As the radius narrows to five 
miles, I continue to observe statistically significant positive impacts in math with the density and 




School Fixed Effects Regression Estimates of the Impact of LSP Competition on Traditional Public School Achievement Across the 
State of Louisiana, First Year Impacts. 







Density Diversity Concentration 
(r) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















Observations 781,703 781,703 781,703 639,533  781,703 781,703 781,703 532,363 
Unique Schools 939 939 939 721  939 939 939 587 
Adj. R-Squared .27 .27 .27 .28  .27 .27 .27 .29 

















Observations 781,733 781,733 781,733 639,562  781,733 781,733 781,733 532,386 
Unique 
Schools 
939 939 939 721  939 939 939 587 
Adj. R-Squared .25 .25 .25 .26  .25 .25 .25 .28 

















Observations 499,695 499,695 499,695 398,588  499,695 499,695 499,695 316,119 
Unique Schools 560 560 560 411  560 560 560 312 
Adj. R-Squared .23 .23 .23 .24  .23 .23 .23 .25 























560 560 560 411  560 560 560 312 
Adj. R-Squared .21 .21 .21 .22  .21 .21 .21 .24 
"D" Schools Only 

















Observations 512,648 512,648 512,648 439,607  512,648 512,648 512,648 372,420 
Unique Schools 607 607 607 490  607 607 607 406 
Adj. R-Squared .30 .30 .30 .30  .30 .30 .30 .31 

















Observations 512,664 512,664 512,664 439,624  512,664 512,664 512,664 372,433 
Unique 
Schools 
607 607 607 490  607 607 607 406 
Adj. R-Squared .28 .28 .28 .29  .28 .28 .28 .30 
"F" Schools Only 

















Observations 263,146 263,146 263,146 230,092  263,146 263,146 263,146 187,526 
Unique Schools 298 298 298 248  298 298 298 197 
Adj. R-Squared .29 .29 .29 .30  .29 .29 .29 .33 

















Observations 263,160 263,160 263,160 230,105  263,160 263,160 263,160 187,537 
Unique 
Schools 
298 298 298 248  298 298 298 197 




Placebo Test  

















Observations 781,703 781,703 781,703 639,533  781,703 781,703 781,703 532,363 
Unique Schools 939 939 939 721  939 939 939 587 
Adj. R-Squared .27 .27 .27 .28  .27 .27 .27 .27 

















Observations 781,733 781,733 781,733 639,562  781,733 781,733 781,733 532,386 
Unique 
Schools 
939 939 939 721  939 939 939 587 
Adj. R-Squared .25 .25 .25 .26  .25 .25 .25 .27 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the standardized math or English Language Arts score; Standard errors clustered by school in 
parentheses; Variables followed by (r) are reverse coded to ease interpretation; Each cell represents the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction between the competition measure, being a "C," "D," or "F" school in Oct 2011, and a post-policy indicator. Coefficients are 
multiplied by 100 for interpretability. Controls at the student level include indicators for gender, race, subsidized lunch eligibility, 
limited English proficiency (LEP), and special education. Controls at the school level include percent male, percent of each race, 
percent of student body eligible for subsidized lunch, percent LEP, and percent special education. Models also include school and year 




Specifically, each additional private school located within a 10-mile radius of a given 
public school is associated with a .0011 SD increase in math performance.1 As we might expect, 
the competitive effect is stronger as the radius narrows. Within a 5-mile radius, each additional 
private school is associated with a .0023 SD increase in math performance. In terms of diversity, 
the addition of one private school religious type within a 10-mile radius is associated with a 
.0092 SD increase in math performance. Again, that effect size grows larger when we narrow the 
radius within which we measure competition. Within a 5-mile radius, the addition of one private 
school religious type is associated with a .0118 SD increase in math performance. Overall, this 
evidence indicates a one-unit increase in competition is associated with a null to .0118 SD 
increase in math performance. Although these estimated effects appear modest in magnitude, 
they are consistent with the prior literature on the competitive effects of private school choice 
programs, such as the analysis of the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program by Figlio and Hart 
(2014), which found increases of .0008 SD for each additional type of nearby private school and 
.0015 SD for every mile the nearest private school moves closer.  
In order to parse out the treatment effect to better understand which, if any, public 
schools may be affected by the LSP, the next three panels compare only a segment of all 
voucher-eligible public schools at a time. The second panel of Table 4 compares “A” and “B” 
graded public schools to just “C” schools, which produced around 18% of the total voucher 
winners (not including students coming from charter schools or schools within New Orleans, 
which are excluded from this analysis). Given the small number of voucher users coming from 
“C”- graded public schools, I do not expect to find strong evidence of a competitive response by 
this group of schools. Indeed, I find mostly null impacts on math scores, with the exception of a 
                                                 




marginally significant .0062SD increase associated with the diversity measure in a 10-mile 
radius. In the models that use students’ ELA achievement as the dependent variable, the 
coefficients on three of the four competition measures reveal null impacts on student outcomes in 
both radii examined. Interestingly, however, student ELA achievement is negatively associated 
with competition using the distance measure, with an effect size of -.0015 SD.  
The third panel reduces the treatment group to just “D” schools. Given that 
approximately three-quarters of voucher-winners in our sample came from a “D” -graded public 
school, this is the group for which I most strongly expect to find a competitive response to the 
LSP, if there was one. Indeed, the math results observed for this group of schools are statistically 
significant and positive for three out of four measures—density, diversity, and concentration. 
The ELA results, meanwhile, are consistently insignificant. In sum, when I examine the LSP’s 
impact on just “D” schools, the competitive effect on math outcomes ranges from null effects to 
.0667 of a standard deviation.  
Looking at the treatment impact on just “F” schools, I observe statistically significant, 
positive effects on students’ math achievement using two of the four competition measures and 
exclusively null effects in ELA. Even though only 8% of voucher winners came from “F”-graded 
public schools, there were approximately five applicants and two winners per school.2 It is 
perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that I find the largest statistically significant impacts for this 
group of schools. Every mile the nearest private school moves closer, public school student math 
score performance in the period after the enactment of the LSP policy increases by .0219 SD. 
The magnitude of this positive and statistically significant effect size is consistent in both 
models— the one relying on a 10- mile radius and the one relying on a 5-mile radius. The largest 
                                                 




result, by far, is associated with the concentration measure of competition. A one-unit increase in 
the Herfindahl Index in a five-mile radius is associated with a .2981 SD increase in student math 
achievement. Overall, the results for “D” and “F” schools in Louisiana suggest that those schools 
in the sample that experienced the greatest loss of students to the LSP responded with a modest 
yet positive increase in students’ math outcomes.  
The final panel of Table 4 displays the results of a placebo test I conduct that changes the 
“post-policy year” indicator from 2013 to 2011, before the LSP expansion was actually enacted. 
I expect to find null results associated with the competition measures in this model and with one 
exception that is the case. The only statistically significant coefficient reported from the sixteen 
regressions represented in the final panel of Table 4 is a negative coefficient of -.0065 SD 
associated with the diversity measure in a five-mile radius which is marginally significant at p < 
.10. Overall, given that none of the coefficients in the final panel are statistically significant at 
conventional levels (p < .05), this builds confidence in the validity of the empirical model 
employed. 
9. Follow Up Analyses 
There are two important follow-up analyses to consider. First, I add charter schools to the 
analysis sample to increase the statistical power of the model by increasing the sample size and 
thus yielding more precise estimates of the impact of competition on math and ELA outcomes. 




School Fixed Effects Regression Estimates of the Impact of LSP Competition on Public School Achievement, Follow Up Analyses 
 10 Mile Radius  5 Mile Radius 
 Distance 
(r) 




Density Diversity Concentration 
(r) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















Observations 789,846 789,846 789,846 645,082  789,846 789,846 789,846 537,912 
Unique 
Schools 
981 951 951 730  951 951 951 596 
Adj. R-
Squared 
.27 .27 .27 .28  .27 .27 .27 .29 

















Observations 789,877 789,877 789,877 645,112  789,877 789,877 789,877 537,936 
Unique 
Schools 
951 951 951 730  951 951 951 596 
Adj. R-
Squared 
.25 .25 .25 .26  .25 .25 .25 .27 

















Observations 816,442 816,442 816,442 671,678  816,442 816,442 816,442 564,508 
Unique 
Schools 






.27 .27 .27 .28  .27 .27 .27 .29 

















Observations 816,470 816,470 816,470 671,705  816,470 816,470 816,470 564,529 
Unique 
Schools 
981 981 981 760  981 981 981 626 
Adj. R-
Squared 
.25 .25 .25 .26  .25 .25 .25 .28 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the standardized math or English Language Arts score; Standard errors clustered by school in 
parentheses; Variables followed by (r) are reverse coded to ease interpretation; Each cell represents the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction between the competition measure, being a "C," "D," or "F" school in Oct 2011, and a post-policy indicator. Coefficients are 
multiplied by 100 for interpretability. Controls at the student level include indicators for gender, race, subsidized lunch eligibility, 
limited English proficiency (LEP), and special education. Controls at the school level include percent male, percent of each race, 
percent of student body eligible for subsidized lunch, percent LEP, and percent special education. Models also include school and year 




Even though charter schools already operate in a competitive marketplace for students, it 
is possible that the expansion of the voucher program served as a mild competitive shock for this 
group of schools by introducing a new set of private school competitors that would previously 
have been financially unattainable for the majority of students they serve. The results presented 
in the top panel of Table 5 confirm this intuition. The coefficients associated with the density and 
diversity measures of competition remain statistically significant, but are smaller in magnitude 
than those reported in the models which focused on changes in traditional public school 
achievement only. Specifically, each additional private school located within a 10-mile radius of 
a given public or charter school is associated with a .0008 SD increase in math performance of 
students in both traditional public and charter schools. The corresponding statistic in a five-mile 
radius is a .0018 SD increase. In terms of diversity, the addition of one private school religious 
type within a 10-mile radius is associated with a .0088 SD increase in math performance. As 
before, that effect size grows larger when we narrow the radius within which we measure 
competition. Within a 5-mile radius, the addition of one private school religious type is 
associated with a .0109 SD increase in the math performance of students in both traditional 
public and charter schools. 
While all analyses thus far exclude New Orleans because of the presence of a pilot 
version of the LSP in that city prior to the program’s statewide expansion, it is worth examining 
if the competitive effects of neighboring private schools became more salient in New Orleans 
with the expansion of the LSP. Because the majority (84%) of public schools in New Orleans are 
charter schools and not traditional public schools (Arce-Trigatti, Harris, Jabbar, & Lincove 
2015), this requires two changes to the analysis sample. Thus, I repeat the statewide analysis 




charter) in New Orleans for which I have data. The results are presented in the bottom panel of 
Table 5. For the first time, there is a positive and statistically significant effect on students’ ELA 
achievement. Specifically, each additional private school located within a 10-mile radius of a 
given public or charter school is associated with a .0005 SD increase in ELA performance. 
Meanwhile, the coefficients associated with the impact of competition density and diversity on 
math performance remain statistically significant and similar in magnitude to those reported in 
the primary analysis, which excluded New Orleans and charter schools. Specifically, each 
additional private school located within a 10-mile (5-mile) radius of a given public or charter 
school is associated with a .0011 SD (.0021 SD) increase in math performance. In terms of 
diversity, the addition of one private school religious type within a 10-mile (5-mile) radius is 
associated with a .0102 SD (.0135 SD) increase in math performance. 
10. Secondary Empirical Approach 
Given that the voucher program design limited participation to students in public schools that 
received a "C," "D," or "F" grade at baseline, it is possible to run a secondary analysis to confirm 
the findings reported above. I employ an alternative identification strategy with stronger internal 
validity—a regression discontinuity (RD) design—to see if the main results can be replicated. If 
the estimates obtained from the RD analysis are largely consistent with the measured estimates 
for “C” schools in the primary analysis, I can be more confident in the validity of the primary 
results. 
The LSP is an ideal situation to apply an RD analysis because school exposure to 
competition from the LSP depends upon ratings from the Louisiana letter grade system for public 
schools, part of the school and district accountability system. Letter grades are determined by a 




status in ELA, math, science, and social studies, and expected normative student longitudinal 
growth. Intervals along the school performance score continuum equate to a given letter grade. 
Low-income students wishing to participate in the LSP must have attended a public school that 
received a letter grade of “C”, “D”, or “F” for the most recent school year in order for students to 
qualify for voucher eligibility. It is reasonable to expect that schools that scored at the lowest 
threshold for receiving a “B” do not differ in substantial ways from those schools that scored at 
the highest threshold for receiving a “C,” allowing for direct comparisons between schools in 
these two groups. The primary difference between these two groups of schools is that those 
schools that received a “C” grade or lower in October 2011 were directly exposed to vouchers 
for their low-income students. A subset of “high-C” schools, therefore, constitutes the treatment 
group for the RD competitive effects analysis of the LSP. It is important to note that, in contrast 
to the primary analysis, “high-C” schools in the RD are deemed to experience the threat of 
competition even if there are no private schools nearby. Meanwhile, the schools that received a 
low “B” grade had a school performance score that was close to the “C” schools, but they were 
not directly treated by the program because they were just above the cut-point. A subset of “low-
B” schools therefore, constitutes the control group. 
RD Sample Selection 
Figure 1 demonstrates the screening process used to generate the RD analysis sample. Starting 
with the universe of students in the state’s testing file in 2010-11, I merge this information with 
the state’s school performance score file for 2010-11, generating an initial sample of 307,772 
students. The first screen keeps those students who have taken the state test (the LEAP or 
iLEAP) as opposed to an alternative assessment such as those used by students with special 




who won the LSP voucher lottery, reducing the sample to 297,766. This ensures that the sample 
is capturing those public school students who remained in the public school system. The third 
and fourth screens exclude charter schools, which already experience competition for enrollment 
and thus are not relevant for this study, and schools in New Orleans, where a pilot version of the 
LSP was already operating.3 This leaves 276,616 students, of which 64,952 attended a “B” 
school and 88,923 attended a “C” school in October 2011. The final analysis sample will be 
chosen from these 153,875 students, depending on the bandwidth selected for the RD analysis, 
which is explained in greater detail in the next section. 
                                                 
3 The sample size reduction associated with excluding New Orleans schools is small because the majority of New 












RD Research Design 
To estimate the competitive impact of the LSP, a reduced-form regression is used, 
(2)  Aijt = τ + θDijt +ρ(Pjt) + ω1Xijt  + ω2Sjt + ζjt 
where Aijt is the average achievement of student i, in school j in year t; Dijt is an indicator for 
attending a school that experienced the threat of competition—i.e., it is a binary variable that 
takes on a value of one if the SPS score of the school attended is 105 or lower and zero 
otherwise;4 Pjt contains the school performance score (SPS) used to assign school grades; Xijt is a 
vector of student level covariates including lagged achievement, gender, race, limited English 
proficiency, free- or reduced-price lunch eligibility, special education status, and grade; Sjt is a 
vector of school level covariates including school percent female/Black/Hispanic/special 
education/limited English proficient, and percent qualifying for free-or reduced-price lunch. 
Finally, ζjt is an idiosyncratic error term. A quartic polynomial is included in Pjt, to control for the 
functional form of the SPS. The estimated impact of competition from private schools through 
the LSP, θ, can be interpreted as causal under the assumption that, conditional on the school 
performance score, the assignment of grades is uncorrelated with the error term ζjt. 
The strength of the RD is that it does not incorporate all eligible public schools—only a 
narrow set of schools above and below the 105-point SPS cut-off that distinguishes “C” schools 
from “B” schools. The more similar the SPS score of the “B” and “C” schools on either side of 
this cut-off, the more similar one might expect these schools to be in both observable and 
unobservable ways, strengthening the internal validity of the analysis. In selecting the width of 
                                                 
4 The reader should note that none of the spatial measures of competition used thus far are 




the “window” of observations to be used for the RD, I start by using the smallest bandwidth 
feasible, which is one point above and one point below the “B”/ “C” cutoff. I also experiment 
with using wider bandwidths of five and ten points above and below the cutoff, which allow me 
to incorporate a larger sample of students. Table 6 presents descriptive statistics of the samples 
of students in “high-C” treatment schools and “low-B” control schools, depending on the 
bandwidth selected. Although only 48 schools and 13,357 students are included in the sample 
when I select the one point trim, student characteristics between the treatment and control groups 
are most comparable when this bandwidth is applied. Specifically, t-tests confirm baseline 
equivalence between the two groups in terms of school type attended, gender, other race, LEP, 
and ELA standardized score. Thus, the primary RD findings will come from the sample with a 1-
point trim and will control for all of the characteristics reported in Table 6 as well as the school 




Descriptive Statistics for RD Analysis of the LSP 
Note: LEP = Limited English Proficient.  
 1pt Trim  5pt Trim  10pt Trim 
  
Treat. Control Diff. p  Treat. 
Contro
l 




Students 6,893 6,464    29,504 32,584    62,647 52,908   
Schools 23 25    107 107    223 180   
School Type               
Elem/ Middle  0.80 0.93 -0.13*** 0.00  0.86 0.88 -0.03*** 0.00  0.86 0.85 0.01*** 0.00 
Combination 0.20 0.07 0.13*** 0.00  0.14 0.12 0.03*** 0.00  0.14 0.15 -0.01*** 0.00 
School Characteristics               
Female 0.50 0.49 0.01 0.12  0.50 0.49 0.01* 0.10  0.49 0.49 0.00 0.29 
Special Education 0.08 0.10 -0.02*** 0.00  0.08 0.09 0.00** 0.04  0.09 0.09 0.00 0.23 
Black 0.24 0.17 0.07*** 0.00  0.25 0.18 0.07*** 0.00  0.28 0.18 0.10*** 0.00 
Hispanic 0.03 0.04 0.01*** 0.00  0.03 0.04 0.00 0.66  0.04 0.03 0.00*** 0.00 
White 0.69 0.75 -0.06*** 0.00  0.67 0.75 -0.07*** 0.00  0.65 0.75 -0.11*** 0.00 
Other Race 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.34  0.04 0.04 0.01*** 0.00  0.04 0.03 0.00** 0.03 
LEP 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.34  0.01 0.01 0.00*** 0.00  0.02 0.01 0.01*** 0.00 
Free Lunch 0.58 0.54 0.04*** 0.00  0.60 0.51 -0.09*** 0.00  0.62 0.51 0.11*** 0.00 
Test Scores, 2010-11               
Average ELA Z Score 0.12 0.13 -0.01 0.57  0.07 0.16 -0.09*** 0.00  0.04 0.18 -0.14*** 0.00 
Average Math Z Score 0.09 0.13 -0.03** 0.01  0.07 0.18 -0.11*** 0.00  0.03 0.21 -0.17*** 0.00 
 
 
Results of RD Analysis  
I first present a graphical analysis of the regression discontinuity at the school level to see if a 
pattern emerges that can later be confirmed by the regression discontinuity analysis conducted at 
the student level. The null results for “C” schools from model (1) are confirmed, as there does 
not appear to be strong evidence of a competitive response in “C” schools. Figure 2 plots school-
average math and English language arts standardized scores against the “B” or “C” letter grade 
received. To aid with interpretation, these scatterplots include a locally weighted “Fan” 
regression line, which uses an Epanechnikov kernel function (Fan and Gijbels, 1996). 
Regressions are calculated separately for “B” and “C” schools and provide a weighted average of 
math and ELA performance for a given school performance score. Because the calculation of 
school letter grades was informed by proficiency rates on ELA and math assessments, one 
expects to see a relationship between the school performance score and the raw scale scores. As 
expected, school-level scores rise gradually within letter grade bands. There is a minor break 
between “B” and “C” schools in math outcomes in both years but nothing of significant 





Figure 2. Louisiana Public Schools’ Average Math and ELA Standardized Scores in 2010-11 
and 2012-13, by “B” and “C” letter grades. The solid lines plot estimates from a locally weighted 




Table 7 presents the results of student-level regressions in the form of equation (2). 
Standardized scores in ELA and math are regressed on the school performance score, an 
indicator for experiencing the threat of competition from the LSP (i.e., attending a “high-C” 
school), and student- and school-level demographic control variables. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school level. The first two columns display the results of the first placebo test in 
which I examine test scores from 2010-11, before the introduction of the LSP. I expect to find no 
significant differences in student outcomes, which is confirmed by the data. When I examine test 
scores from 2012-13, when the competitive threat was present, there is still no difference in test 
scores between “high-C” and “low-B” schools, conditional on the school performance score. As 
a robustness check and to maximize the power of the RD, I also increase the size of the 
bandwidth to five and ten points above and below the cut off to see if the inclusion of more 
observations alters the results, which it does not. I also experiment with including charter schools 
in addition to traditional public schools, and including schools in New Orleans but the indicator 




The Impact of LSP Competition on Student Achievement, RD Results Comparing "High-C" (Treatment) to "Low-B" (Control) Schools 
  2011 (Baseline) 2013 
 Math ELA  Math  ELA 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
















1-Point Bandwidth  ✓ ✓  ✓    ✓   
5-Point Bandwidth      ✓    ✓  
10-Point Bandwidth       ✓    ✓ 
Schools 48 48  44 201 382  44 201 382 
Observations 10,435 10,438  8,610 39,202 70,859  8,612 39,205 70,863 
Placebo Test: "A" v. "B" Schools          












1-Point Bandwidth     ✓    ✓   
5-Point Bandwidth      ✓    ✓  
10-Point Bandwidth       ✓    ✓ 
Schools    17 64 147  17 64 147 
Observations    3,513 12,443 25,413  3,511 12,441 25,410 
Placebo Test: "C" v. "D" Schools          












1-Point Bandwidth     ✓    ✓   
5-Point Bandwidth      ✓    ✓  
10-Point Bandwidth       ✓    ✓ 
Schools    47 185 381  47 185 381 





  2011 (Baseline)   2013 
 Math ELA  Math ELA  Math ELA  
Placebo Test: "D" v. "F" Schools          












1-Point Bandwidth     ✓    ✓   
5-Point Bandwidth      ✓    ✓  
10-Point Bandwidth       ✓    ✓ 
Schools    16 53 134  16 53 134 
Observations    2,820 6,744 20,244  2,819 6,739 20,234 
Note: Estimates presented in standard deviation units. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses. All models 
include controls for lagged achievement, gender, race, limited English proficiency, free and reduced lunch eligibility, special 
education status, student grade, and school average measures of each of the demographic variables; Charter schools and New Orleans 




Table 7 also displays the results of further placebo tests, which I conduct by running the 
RD with different school letter grade combinations. Instead of comparing “High-C” and “Low-
B” schools, I compare all other grade band combinations (i.e., “A” v. “B” schools, “C” v. “D” 
schools, and “D” v. “F” schools). None of the estimates in any of these models are statistically 
significant, increasing confidence in the validity of this approach. 
RD Analysis by Competitive Threat Level  
It is possible that the RD analysis includes many traditional public schools that do not have any 
realistic private school competitors in close proximity. Thus, even though their students become 
eligible for vouchers, the traditional public school administrators and teachers would be aware 
that there are no viable private school options for students to use a voucher to transfer to. If this 
is the case, it is possible the overall effect size is attenuated by the inclusion of such schools. In 
order to combine the best elements of the two distinct methodological approaches employed in 
this study, I identify those traditional public schools that experience high levels of competition, 
measured by the four geocoded competition measures described in (1). Specifically, I identify 
those public schools that experience the highest level of competitive threat by limiting the 
sample to just those observations that fall in the top third of the distributions of the four 
competition measures, which are all measured at baseline. In terms of distance, I limit the sample 
to public schools whose nearest competitor is less than 1.5 miles away. In terms of density, I 
limit the sample to public schools with 8 or more competitors within a 10-mile radius. In terms 
of diversity, I limit the sample to those public schools with 4 or more types of schools in a 10 
mile radius. In terms of concentration, I limit the sample to those schools whose Herfindahl 
Index value is less than or equal to .35. With this refined sample, I then re-run the RD analysis 









The Impact of LSP Competition on Student Achievement, RD Results Focusing on Schools Facing High Levels of Competition 
 Math  ELA 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
High Competition, Distance: Nearest Competitor is Less Than 1.5 Miles Away 












1-Point Bandwidth  ✓    ✓   
5-Point Bandwidth   ✓    ✓  
10-Point Bandwidth    ✓    ✓ 
Schools 11 54 96  11 54 96 
Observations 2,186 10,980 20,156  2,186 10,979 20,155 
High Competition, Density: 8 or more Competitors within a 10 Mile Radius 












1-Point Bandwidth  ✓    ✓   
5-Point Bandwidth   ✓    ✓  
10-Point Bandwidth    ✓    ✓ 
Schools 12 51 87  12 51 87 
Observations 2,188 12,439 21,462  2,188 12,438 21,461 
High Competition, Diversity: More than 4 Types of Schools in 10-Mile Radius 












1-Point Bandwidth  ✓    ✓   
5-Point Bandwidth   ✓    ✓  
10-Point Bandwidth    ✓    ✓ 
Schools 13 56 96  13 56 96 





 Math  ELA 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
High Competition, Herfindahl Index Values Less Than .35 









1-Point Bandwidth  ✓    ✓   
5-Point Bandwidth   ✓    ✓  
10-Point Bandwidth    ✓    ✓ 
Schools  34 56   34 56 
Observations   9,631 15,766    9,635 15,770 
Note: Estimates presented in standard deviation units. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level in parentheses. All models 
include controls for lagged achievement, gender, race, limited English proficiency, free and reduced lunch eligibility, special 
education status, student grade, and school average measures of each of the demographic variables; Charter schools and New Orleans 
schools are excluded from this sample; n/a indicates cells in which there were insufficient observations to generate estimates; *** 
significant at p < .01, ** significant at p <.05, * significant at p <.10 
 
 
The first panel displays the results of the competitive impact of the LSP on public schools whose 
nearest competitor is less than 1.5 miles away. There are null effects associated with the 10-point 
and 5-point bandwidth but when the sample is narrowed to just one point above and below the 
SPS cutoff, I find significant positive impacts on math achievement of 0.42 SD and on ELA 
achievement of 0.22 SD. The second panel displays the results of the competitive impact of the 
LSP on public schools with 8 or more competitors within a 10-mile radius. Again, there are null 
effects associated with the 10-point and 5-point bandwidth, but when the sample is narrowed to 
just one point above and below the SPS cutoff, I find significant positive impacts on ELA 
achievement of 0.32 SD. The third panel displays the results of the competitive impact of the 
LSP on public schools with more than 4 types of private school competitors in a 10-mile radius. 
As before, there are null effects associated with the 10-point and 5-point bandwidth, but when 
the sample is narrowed to just one point above and below the SPS cutoff, I find significant 
positive impacts on math achievement of 0.10 SD. The fourth panel displays the results of the 
competitive impact of the LSP on public schools with a Herfindahl Index less than or equal to 
0.35. There are null effects associated with the 10-point and 5-point bandwidth and insufficient 
observations to examine effects when the sample is narrowed to a one-point bandwidth. 
11. Discussion 
The results presented in this article show that public school performance in Louisiana was either 
unaffected or modestly improved as a result of competition. In particular, those schools most 
affected by the program—the lowest-graded public schools, those that lost the greatest number of 
students per school, and those with realistic private school competition in their geographic 
area—had the largest response to the injection of competition. While some models reported null 




Two empirical specifications are employed—a school fixed effects model that utilizes 
information about private school competition from geocoded measures of distance, density, 
diversity, and concentration of competition and a regression discontinuity design that tests 
whether students in “high-C” schools that are exposed to competition from the LSP realize 
greater performance gains than their peers in “low-B” public schools that are similar in many 
respects but are unaffected by competition from the program. The overall results from the school 
fixed effects analysis reveal null impacts in ELA and positive impacts in two out of four 
specifications in math. The RD estimates of a subsample of "C" and "B" schools find null effects 
across both Math and ELA. 
While the overall effects observed in this analysis ranged from null findings to small 
positive effects, from a policy perspective, it is important to note that the largest effects were 
observed for those public schools that are located in those geographical areas in which students 
had realistic private school options after the voucher program’s expansion. This finding raises 
important policy questions about the need to promote and maintain a high-quality, supply side 
response in the context of state-wide private school choice programs such as the LSP (Egalite, 
2014; Kisida, Wolf, & Rhinesmith, 2015). For instance, to attract high quality private schools to 
participate in such a program, policymakers need to consider the value at which to set the 
voucher value, whether or not to allow private schools to impose admissions restrictions on 
applications, and how to balance mandates for testing and reporting requirements with the desire 
for private schools to preserve autonomy. 
There are a number of contextual factors that the reader should bear in mind when 
interpreting these results. First, this program was assessed in its first year of operation so the 




become sufficiently established to generate the type of competitive pressure that might prompt a 
clear public school response. Further, lawsuits filed against the program may have affected 
school administrators’ perceptions of the permanency of the program, diluting any potential 
competitive pressure by giving the impression that the program could be quickly halted. For 
these reasons, it will be important to continue studying the systemic impacts of the LSP as later 
years of data become available. 
Second, it is unclear how much power a traditional public school principal really has in 
order to respond to competition (Sullivan, Campbell, & Kisida, 2008). In many schools, budget 
setting, policy development, and hiring decisions are made at the district level, leaving the 
principal with few assets to deploy in ways that might measurably impact student performance.  
Third, this analysis examines student achievement on math and ELA standardized tests to 
judge the competitive impact of the LSP but public schools may respond to the competitive 
pressure of the LSP in other ways that are not captured by these test score gains and thus would 
not show up in this type of analysis. It could be the case that public schools focused on science, 
art, music, sports, or social studies as a mechanism to retain students who would be eligible for 
the voucher program. Alternatively, they could have responded to family preferences by offering 
more diverse electives, for example, or by conducting renovations on school facilities or taking 
active steps to better market their school (Holley, Egalite, & Lueken, 2013). Furthermore, it 
might also be possible that the effects of competition might be felt in long-term outcomes such as 
improvements in student graduation rates or college enrollment if public schools respond to the 
competitive threat by sharpening their focus on attainment goals for students and cultivating an 




Finally, this voucher program is means-tested, meaning it is designed to target low-
income students, not the universe of public school students. This feature of program design may 
significantly shape the public schools’ perception of the program. It is even possible that public 
schools could be supportive of a program that attracts their poorest and possibly hardest-to-
educate students. Instead of viewing this targeted voucher program as a threat to which they must 
respond, public schools may actually view it as a release valve and welcome the program as a 
positive outlet to which they can direct struggling students. 
12. Conclusion 
The findings from this competitive effects analysis of the LSP indicate that public school 
performance in ELA and math was either unaffected or modestly improved in response to 
competition from the LSP, particularly in those schools that experienced the strongest 
competitive threat. The primary contribution of this study is that it addresses the claim that 
voucher programs such as the LSP increase student performance by “lifting all boats” (Friedman, 
1962; Hoxby, 2003). The results presented here are consistent with that hypothesis. The 
competitive threat of the LSP ranges from negligible to modestly positive in the public schools 
exposed to the threat of competition, with effect sizes growing in magnitude as the competitive 
threat looms larger. As large-scale school voucher programs continue to expand across the 
country, policymakers who are hopeful for the potential for market-based reforms to improve 
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